

Protestant Prussia and that a strong Germany would be a useful bulwark against French or Russian expansion. Russia, concerned with reform at home, showed little interest in central Europe. Her sympathies lay with Prussia. She had still not forgiven Austria for her policy during the Crimean War and there was a growing clash of interests between the two in the Balkans. Austria's diplomatic isolation helped Bismarck. So did the fact that Austrian finances were in a perilous position. This meant that she was unable to modernise her army.

### e) The Constitutional Crisis Solved

Bismarck's appointment as chief minister was seen as a deliberate affront to the Prussian liberals. They regarded him as a bigoted reactionary. Given that he had no ministerial experience, he was not expected to last long in power. On 30 September 1862, in his first speech to the Prussian Parliament, he declared:

- 1 Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism, but to its power. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden can indulge in liberalism, but no one will expect them to undertake Prussia's role ... It is not through speeches and majority decisions that the great questions of the day are decided.
- 5 That was the great mistake of 1848–9. It is by iron and blood.

This phrase, afterwards reversed to 'blood and iron', became almost synonymous with Bismarck. In truth, the speech was not his greatest effort. What he had meant to say was that if Prussia was to fulfil its role in leading Germany towards greater unity, it could not do so without an efficient army, which the King's government was seeking to build. His speech badly misfired. To most liberal nationalists such blood-curdling talk from a notorious reactionary was seen as a deliberate provocation. He thus failed to build any bridges to his political opponents.

In the end, he solved the problem of the military budget by withdrawing it, declaring that the support of parliament for the army bill was unnecessary as the army reforms could be financed from taxation. To liberal suggestions that the people should refuse to pay taxes, Bismarck replied that he had 200,000 soldiers ready to persuade them. Parliament declared his actions illegal but he ignored it. The taxes were collected and the army reorganised as if parliament did not exist. For four years and through two wars, he directed Prussian affairs without a constitutionally approved budget and in the face of fierce parliamentary opposition. New elections in 1863 gave the liberals 70 per cent of the parliamentary seats. 'Men spat on the place where I trod in the streets', Bismarck wrote later. But he rightly judged that his opponents would avoid an appeal to force: indeed, they had no military force to pit against the King, who could also rely on the traditional support of his people. Bismarck also calculated that everything would be forgiven if he achieved foreign policy success.

## 4 Austro-Prussian Conflict

**KEY ISSUE** Why did Austria and Prussia go to war?

### a) Bismarck's Problems

Relations between Austria and Prussia, cool before 1862, became much cooler after Bismarck's appointment. In December 1862 he warned Austria that unless she recognised Prussia as an equal in Germany, she was inviting catastrophe. It should be said that in 1862–3 the prospect of Bismarck defeating Austria and bringing about a Prussian-dominated Germany was highly unlikely, Bismarck's own position in Prussia seemed vulnerable. Prussian (and German) liberals regarded him with hostility and contempt. In many respects Prussia's position in Germany was similarly vulnerable. Its territories straddled central Europe. Austria had a population almost twice that of Prussia and had a larger army. The majority of German states had no wish to be dominated by Prussia.

### b) The Polish Revolt

A century earlier Prussia, Russia and Austria had divided Poland between them. Relations between Prussia and her Polish citizens had long been uneasy. Bismarck thought the Poles were troublemakers. In a private letter written to his sister in 1861 he advocated:

Strike the Poles so that they despair for their lives. I have every sympathy for their plight, but if we want to survive we cannot but exterminate them.

In 1863 when the inhabitants of Russian Poland rose in revolt against the Tsar, Bismarck viewed the situation with concern. Trouble in any part of Poland could constitute a threat to Prussia as it could escalate into a general Polish uprising. The Tsar ordered the revolt to be suppressed. France, Austria and Britain protested and offered mediation. Bismarck took the opportunity to gain Russian friendship by sending an envoy to Moscow with offers of military assistance. The Tsar, confident he could defeat the Poles unaided, refused the offer but agreed to a Convention by which Prussia would hand over to the Russians any Polish rebels who crossed the border.

Prussian liberals, who hated autocratic Russia, protested at Bismarck's action. So too did France, Britain and Austria. Bismarck found himself isolated. In an attempt to extricate himself, he resorted to the pretence that the Convention did not exist because it had never been ratified. This angered the Tsar and Prussia was left completely friendless. The rising was finally suppressed in 1864. In the end Prussia emerged from the affair less disastrously than Bismarck

deserved or expected. The Tsar had been offended by Austrian and French criticism, and, as a result, the danger of an Austrian-French-Russian coalition against Prussia, which Bismarck feared, now seemed even more improbable. It was far more likely that Prussia would be able to count on Russia remaining neutral in the event of war with Austria or France.

### c) The Danish War: 1864

In November 1863 the childless King Frederick VII of Denmark died. Frederick had also been the ruler of the two duchies of Schleswig and Holstein which had been under Danish rule for 400 years. The population of Schleswig was mixed Danish and German, while that of Holstein was almost entirely German. Holstein was a member of the German Confederation; Schleswig was not. There had often been trouble over the Duchies. In 1848 the Holsteiners had rebelled against Denmark and Prussian troops had marched to their aid with the support of the Frankfurt Parliament, until Russian intervention had forced the Prussian army into retreat.

A treaty signed in London by the Great Powers in 1852 had agreed that Frederick would be succeeded as ruler of Denmark and of the Duchies by Christian of Glücksburg, who was heir to the Danish throne through marriage to the King's first cousin. Schleswig and Holstein contested his claim on the grounds that the Salic Law operated there. This law forbade inheritance through the female line, and the Schleswig-Holsteiners put forward their own claimant, the Prince of Augustenburg. He, however, did not object to being passed over in the treaty, having been well paid to agree, although he never formally renounced his rights.

When Christian became King of Denmark in November 1863, government officials in Holstein refused to swear allegiance to him and the son of the Prince of Augustenburg now claimed both duchies on the grounds that his father had never signed away his rights to them. This move was passionately supported by German nationalists. King Christian immediately put himself in the wrong by incorporating Schleswig into Denmark, thereby violating the 1852 Treaty of London. In December 1863 the smaller states of the German Confederation, condemning the Danish King's action as tyrannical, sent an army into Holstein on behalf of the Duke of Augustenburg, the Prince of Augustenburg's son. Augustenburg became the most popular figure in Germany, a symbol of nationalism, uniting both liberals and conservatives.

Bismarck was not influenced by German public opinion. However, he did see that the crisis offered splendid opportunities for Prussia. He hoped to annex the two duchies, strengthening Prussian power in north Germany and winning credit for himself into the bargain. He thus had no wish to see the Duke of Augustenburg in control of

another independent state in north Germany. Nor did he care one iota about the rights of the Germans within the duchies. 'It is not a concern of ours', he said privately, 'whether the Germans of Holstein are happy'.

He first won Austrian help. Austrian ministers had very different aims from Bismarck. Austria, while supporting the Augustenburg claim, was suspicious of rampant German nationalism. Anxious to prevent Bismarck from allying Prussia with the forces of nationalism, she was happy to pursue her traditional policy of co-operating with Prussia. Bismarck, implying that he too supported Augustenburg, kept secret his own expansionist agenda. Agreeing to an alliance, the two Powers now issued an ultimatum to Denmark threatening to occupy Schleswig unless she withdrew the new constitution within 48 hours. Denmark refused. Thus, in January 1864 a combined Prussian and Austrian army, acting independently of the Confederation, advanced through Holstein and into Schleswig. Austria hoped she had taken Prussia prisoner. Bismarck was nearer the truth in his view that he had 'hired' Austria.

Failing to win the support of Britain, France or Russia, Denmark agreed that the Schleswig-Holstein matter should be resolved by the decision of a European conference. However, the London Conference (April-June 1864) failed to reach agreement. Counting on Britain's support, the Danes refused to make concessions and fighting recommenced. Despite British Prime Minister Palmerston's boast that 'if Denmark had to fight, she would not fight alone', there was little Britain could actually do - or did. Denmark quickly saw sense and surrendered in July 1864.

### d) The Results of the Danish War

By the Treaty of Vienna in October 1864 the King of Denmark gave up his rights over Schleswig and Holstein which were to be jointly administered by Austria and Prussia. The question of the long-term fate of the Duchies soon became a source of acute tension between the two Powers, as Bismarck may have intended. Public opinion in Germany and the Duchies expected that Augustenburg would now become duke. However, Bismarck proposed that he be installed on conditions which would have left him under Prussia's power. This was totally unacceptable to Austria and to the Duke, who refused to become a Prussian puppet. Austria turned to the Diet. A motion calling for the recognition of the Duke of Augustenburg, easily passed. But Prussia, which had opposed the motion, ensured nothing was done. Thus by the summer of 1865 the future of the Duchies was still not settled, and tension between Austria and Prussia was high. Austria continued to support Augustenburg's claim while Prussia worked for annexation. 'We are reaching a parting of the ways', said Bismarck. 'Unfortunately our tickets are for different lines'.

But neither Austria nor Bismarck wanted war at this stage: Austria, almost financially bankrupt, regarded war as too expensive a luxury. Bismarck was aware that William I was reluctant to fight a fellow German state. Nor was he convinced that the Prussian army was yet ready to fight and win. While Bismarck and William I were 'taking the waters' at the fashionable Austrian spa town of Bad Gastein, an Austrian envoy arrived to open negotiations and to offer concessions over the Duchies. As a result of this meeting it was agreed in August 1865, by the Convention of Gastein, that the joint Austro-Prussian administration of the Duchies should be ended. The Duchy nearest to Prussia, Holstein, would be given to Austria and Schleswig, to Prussia to administer, but the two Powers would retain joint sovereignty over both Duchies. Bismarck knew he could now pick a quarrel with Austria over Holstein at any time he wanted.

Historians have argued for over a century about Bismarck's motives and about his aims in dealing with the Schleswig-Holstein affair. Had Bismarck used the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, as he later claimed, as a means of manoeuvring Austria into open confrontation with Prussia as a way of settling the problem of leadership in Germany? Or did he (whatever he said later) have no clear policy at the time except to 'allow events to ripen'? Historian A.J.P. Taylor thought that he 'may well have hoped to manoeuvre Austria out of the Duchies, perhaps even out of the headship of Germany, by diplomatic strokes ... His diplomacy in this period seems rather calculated to frighten Austria than to prepare for war'.

The particular problem of the Duchies was temporarily solved, but the more general problem of rivalry between Prussia and Austria remained. While Bismarck may not have wanted war at this stage, he realised that it was a distinct possibility. He thus did all he could to strengthen Prussia's international position. Confident that Britain and Russia were unlikely to interfere in a war between Austria and Prussia, his main fear was France. In October 1865 he met the French Emperor Napoleon III at Biarritz in the south of France. Historians continue to conjecture what occurred. Almost certainly nothing specific was agreed if only because neither man wanted a specific agreement. Bismarck was not prepared to offer German territory in the Rhineland in return for France's neutrality. Napoleon, calculating that a war between the two German Powers would be exhausting and inconclusive, intended to remain neutral and then to turn this to good advantage by mediating between the two combatants, gaining a much greater reward in the process than anything Bismarck could presently offer. Given Napoleon's anti-Austrian stance, it took little genius on Bismarck's part to secure the Emperor's good wishes.

### e) War with Austria

Over the winter of 1865–6 Prussian–Austrian relations deteriorated. In February 1866 at a meeting of the Prussian Crown Council

Bismarck made a clear statement that war with Austria was only a matter of time. It would be fought not just to settle the final fate of the Duchies, but over the wider issue of who should control Germany. He would achieve by war what the liberals of 1848–9 had failed to achieve by peaceful means: a united Germany. But this united Germany would be under Prussian control.

The groundwork was carefully laid. A secret alliance was made with Italy in April 1866, by which Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, agreed to follow Prussia if she declared war on Austria within three months. In return Italy would acquire Venetia from Austria as her reward when the war ended.

Immediately after the treaty with Italy had been signed, Bismarck stoked up tension with Austria over Holstein and over proposals to reform the Confederation. Bismarck knew that these proposals, which included setting up a representative assembly elected by universal manhood suffrage, would be unacceptable to Austria.

The Austrian army could not mobilise quickly, so the Austrians, afraid of a surprise attack, were forced to take what appeared to be the aggressive step of mobilising unilaterally in April 1866. Prussia mobilised in May, seemingly as a response to Austrian threats. Britain, France and Russia proposed a Congress to discuss the situation. Bismarck felt compelled to agree; to do otherwise would put him in a weak position. But he was very relieved when Austria refused, making the Congress unworkable. He kept up a front of wanting peace by sending an envoy to Vienna, but this mission came to nothing.

The situation deteriorated further when, in early June, Austria broke off talks with Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein and, in breach of previous promises, referred the problem of the Duchies to the Diet. Bismarck's response was to send a Prussian army into Austrian-controlled Holstein. Austrian troops were permitted to withdraw peacefully. To Bismarck's surprise and disappointment this did not immediately lead to war. To stir things up, he presented to the Diet an extended version of his proposals for a reform of the Federal Constitution. Austria was to be excluded from the Confederation, there should be a national parliament elected by universal suffrage, and all troops in north Germany should be under Prussian command. The next day Austria asked the Diet to reject Prussia's proposals and to mobilise for war. Censored by the Diet, Prussia withdrew from the Confederation, declared it dissolved and invited all the other German states to ally themselves with her against Austria. Instead, most began mobilising against Prussia. Bismarck now issued an ultimatum to three northern states, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony, to side with Prussia or else to be regarded as enemies. When the ultimatums were rejected, Prussian troops invaded the three states. Hesse-Cassel and Saxony offered no resistance, but Hanover fought until her army was defeated. The war had begun, without any formal declaration. Effectively a German civil war, it became known as the Seven Weeks' War, for that was the length of its duration.

The future of Bismarck, Prussia and Germany lay with the Prussian army. 'If we are beaten, I shall not return. I can die only once, and it befits the vanquished to die', said Bismarck, somewhat melodramatically. The Prussian army was under the command of General von Moltke, a gifted military leader. Advance planning and preparation, particularly in the use of the railways for moving troops, meant that mobilisation, while not perfect, was much more efficient than that of the Austrian army.

Austria's position was far from hopeless. She had more men, 400,000, to the Prussians' 300,000, support from most of the other German states, and the advantage of a central position. Initially many Prussians were lukewarm about the war. In France the betting odds were four to one in Austria's favour. However, the Italians fulfilled their part of the secret treaty, following Prussia into the war. This meant that the Austrian army was forced to fight on two fronts, in the north against the Prussians and in the south against the Italians. The Italian army, weak and inefficient, was quickly defeated by the Austrians. To prevent the victorious Austrians in the south from linking up with their troops in the north, Moltke took the risk of crossing into Bohemia. One single-track railway ran from Vienna to Bohemia. By contrast Prussia used five lines to bring its troops southwards. Moltke adopted the risky strategy of dividing his forces for faster movement, only concentrating them on the eve of battle. Fortunately for Prussia, the Austrian high command missed several opportunities to annihilate the separate Prussian armies.

On 3 July 1866 the major battle of the war was fought at Sadowa (called Königgrätz by the Prussians). Nearly half a million men were involved, and the two sides were almost equally balanced. The Austrians were well equipped with artillery and used it effectively at the start of the battle, but they were soon caught in a Prussian pincer movement. The Prussians brought into use their new breech-loading needle guns. Its rate of fire was five times greater than anything the Austrians possessed, and it proved decisive. The Austrian army was forced to retreat in disorder. The Prussians had won the battle and with it the war because the Austrian government recognised that further fighting would almost certainly lead to further defeats and might even result in a break-up of the Empire. For Austria the priority was a rapid end to the fighting at any reasonable cost. Prussia was now in a position to dictate terms as the victor. It was a personal victory too for Bismarck, and put him in a position to dominate not only Prussia, but also the whole of Germany for the next quarter of a century.

Bismarck returned to Berlin with the King, Moltke and a hundred captured Austrian guns to a hero's welcome. A grateful Prussia, most of whose people had been no more than initially lukewarm about the war, presented him with a reward of £60,000, with which he bought a run-down estate at Varzin in Pomerania. He was promoted to Major General in honour of the victory. It had been noticeable that at meet-

ings of the 'war cabinet' he had been the only one present wearing civilian clothes. Any uniform he was then entitled to would have marked him as an officer of lower rank than anyone else there, and he could not have borne that. Now he was a high-ranking officer he could flaunt his uniform on an equal footing, and he never again appeared in public except in full dress uniform. He had earned his spurs and intended to wear them in a Prussia, and later a Germany, dominated by military power.

After Sadowa, Austria was at the mercy of Prussia. William I had previously been unwilling to wage wholehearted war on a fellow monarch; but he now proposed an advance on Vienna. Bismarck, fearful that France and Russia might intervene and anxious to maintain Austria as a Great Power, counselled caution. He wrote to William as follows:

- 1 We have to avoid wounding Austria too severely; we have to avoid leaving behind in her unnecessary bitterness or feeling or desire for revenge. We ought to keep the possibility of becoming friends again. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of
- 5 every opponent of ours ... German Austria we could neither wholly nor partly make use of. The acquisition of provinces like Austrian Silesia and part of Bohemia could not strengthen the Prussian state; it would not lead to an amalgamation of German Austria with Prussia, and Vienna could not be governed by Berlin as a mere dependency.

At a noisy and angry meeting of the 'war cabinet' on 23 July, William I and his senior generals raged against Bismarck's policy of not annexing any Austrian territory, while Bismarck himself was in a state of nervous collapse and floods of tears in an adjoining room, threatening suicide if his advice was not taken. In the end Bismarck got his way. The war was brought to a speedy end and a moderate peace concluded with Austria. The only territory lost by Austria as a result of the Seven Weeks' War (Holstein apart) was Venetia in Italy. Ironically, Austria had won substantial victories against Italian forces, both on land and at sea.

### ACTIVITY

Read carefully the extract from Bismarck's letter to William I in 1866. Answer the following questions:

- a) Bismarck gives two major reasons for not annexing Austrian territory. What are they?
- b) What evidence does the extract contain about Bismarck's interpretation of the phrase 'German nationalism'?
- c) Bismarck often expressed contradictory views on the same topic. This means that his statements must be corroborated with other evidence as far as possible. Is it likely that Bismarck genuinely held the views expressed in the letter? Explain your answer.

## 5 Prussian Ascendancy

**KEY ISSUE** What were the results of the Seven Weeks' War?

### a) The Treaty of Prague


An armistice was signed between Prussia and Austria in July and was followed by a peace treaty, the Treaty of Prague, in August. The terms of the treaty were mainly concerned with the remodelling of North Germany as Prussia wished. Prussia annexed a good deal of territory, including both Schleswig and Holstein, as well as Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, Nassau and Frankfurt, along with their four million inhabitants. All other German states north of the River Main, including Saxony, were to be formed into a North German Confederation under Prussian leadership (see map on page 71).

Bismarck might have pressed for the unification of all Germany in 1866. However, as well as the threat of French intervention, he also feared that if Prussia absorbed too much too soon, especially the anti-Prussian Catholic south, this might be more trouble than it was worth. The four states south of the River Main – Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt – thus retained their independence. But all agreed to sign a secret military alliance with Prussia, whereby, in the event of war, they would not only fight alongside Prussia but would put their armies under the command of the King of Prussia. Why the states agreed to sacrifice their military sovereignty so readily is not certain. Perhaps they were sufficiently afraid of Bismarck to feel safer in some sort of alliance with him. They also feared a possible French attack.

The treaty of Prague is usually seen as a milestone on the way to German unity. Ironically in 1866, by destroying the unity of the German Confederation, it could be seen as dividing rather than uniting Germany. After 1866 Germans were separated into three distinct units: the North German Confederation; the four South German states; and the Austrian Empire.

### b) The North German Confederation

Bismarck had shown a calculated moderation and clemency in his treatment of Austria. He showed neither of these to his fellow north Germans. Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Hanover, Frankfurt and Schleswig-Holstein were not consulted about uniting with Prussia; they were just annexed. The wealthy city of Frankfurt had not opposed Prussia during the war, but was taken over just the same. The city was starved into surrender and was fined the enormous sum of 25 million guilders, with one million guilders interest for every day the fine remained unpaid. The burgomaster hanged himself. The aged King



Germany and Austria in 1867

of Hanover was driven out, his personal fortune confiscated (it came in useful to Bismarck later when it was used to bribe the King of Bavaria), and his kingdom taken over by Prussia.

Those north German states, such as Saxony, not annexed by Prussia were left with some independence within the North German Confederation. Some historians have seen this as a trial run by Bismarck for an eventual wider federation taking in all *Kleindeutschland*. They argue that as he had no scruples he could easily have annexed the remaining northern states if he had so wished and did not do so because he wanted to show the Germans south of the Main not only how considerate an ally Prussia could be to those states which co-operated with her, but also how advantageous membership of a Prussian-controlled federation could be. This argument does not seem very convincing. More credible is the suggestion that he saw no advantage to Prussia in too speedy a takeover of so many states at once. Such action would only lead to a dilution of Prussian culture and traditions. Instead of Prussia absorbing Germany, Germany would end up absorbing Prussia.

At the end of 1866 Bismarck began drafting the constitution for the North German Confederation. This was accepted in April 1867 and came into effect in July 1867. The North German Confederation lasted only four years, but its constitution was to continue, largely unaltered, as the constitution of the German Empire. It was designed to fit the requirements of Prussian power and Bismarck's own political position.

The King of Prussia was President of the North German Confederation and also the commander-in-chief, and had the power of declaring war and making peace. He appointed and could dismiss the Federal Chancellor.

The states, including of course Prussia, had substantial rights, keeping their own rulers and being governed by their own laws and constitutions with their own parliamentary assemblies. They had their own legal and administrative systems, and local taxation met the cost of government services, provided education and supported the Church. The *Bundesrat* (the Federal Council) was the upper house of the Confederation's parliament. Here the various states were represented by delegates who acted on the instructions of their governments. The number of delegates was fixed in relation to the size of the state: out of 43 votes, Prussia had 17, Saxony four and most of the others one each. Decisions were made by a simple majority vote and, in practice, Prussia was never outvoted in the *Bundesrat*.

The *Reichstag* was the lower house of the Confederacy's parliament. It was elected by universal manhood suffrage – a giant step towards democracy. However, its powers were limited. The Federal Chancellor (the Chief Minister) was the main driving force in the Confederation. He represented the Prussian king in the *Bundesrat*. He was not responsible to the *Reichstag* nor did he need majority support in it. He was responsible only to the

President of the Confederation, who could appoint or dismiss the Chancellor.

All laws needed approval of the *Reichstag*, the *Bundesrat* and the King of Prussia as President of the Confederation. They also needed the signature of the Chancellor.

Bismarck was always opposed to the idea of parliamentary government on the British model, which reduced the crown to symbolic status and put power in the hands of parliament. His declared view of the political abilities of his fellow Germans was very low:

Considering the political incapacity of the average German, the parliamentary system would lead to conditions such as had prevailed in 1848, that is to say weakness and incompetence at the top and ever new demands from below.

Given his views, Bismarck's insistence on universal manhood suffrage in the election of the *Reichstag* is somewhat surprising. However, he believed that the traditional loyalties of peasants would preserve the conservative order in Germany (as they did in France) and thus had no problem with the concept of universal suffrage. However, he did not intend the *Reichstag* to be much more than an organ of public opinion – a political safety valve playing an insignificant part in public life. Speaking in confidence to a Saxon minister, he declared he was trying 'to destroy parliamentarianism by parliamentarianism'. In effect, he hoped that the activities of a weak *Reichstag* would help to discredit parliamentary institutions in German eyes. Certainly, the democratic manner of the election did not compensate for the great weakness of the *Reichstag*, that ministers, including the Chancellor, were not members of it and were not responsible to it.

### c) Popular Support for Bismarck

On the same day as the Battle of Sadowa, elections were held in Prussia. Patriotic war fever resulted in a big increase in the number of conservatives elected to the Prussian Parliament. The numbers jumped from 34 to 142, while the liberal parties were reduced from 253 to 148. Moreover, after news of the victory and after the terms of the peace treaty were announced many liberals changed their attitude to Bismarck. He was now acclaimed rather than maligned. This ensured an era of harmony between Bismarck and the Prussian parliament. Only seven votes were cast against an Indemnity Bill introduced by Bismarck at the beginning of the new session. This Bill asked Parliament to grant an 'Indemnity' for any actions taken by the government during the previous four years without Parliament's consent. Bismarck appealed for better relations between Parliament and the government and spoke of the need for the government to work jointly with Parliament to build a new Germany.

Both the left- and right-wing parties in Parliament split into new